Abstract. We derive the optimal mechanism for the provision of n identical public goods in an economy with two agents, binary valuations. The mechanism "links" the n problems together because decisions and transfers are based on the whole vector of valuations of the agents. In particular, if agents have mixed valuations for a public good (one agent has a high valuation, the other a low valuation), the good is provided if the low valuation agent has a suciently high average valuation for the whole bundle of goods. We show that the mechanism is asymptotically ecient and we provide an example which compares the gains in terms of eciency with optimal separate provision and with another asymptotically ecient mechanism in the literature.
Introduction
Ineciency in public good provision is a well known problem in economics. In general, when the decision is decentralized, free riding behavior leads to an underprovision of public goods. Besides, even if the decision is centralized, the presence of asymmetric information might make impossible to provide the ecient level of public goods. This occurs when the central agency, besides achieving eciency, needs the good to be self-nancing and has no coercive power or does not want to exert it (see Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) ) .
This problem is not peculiar to public good provision. When participation and budget balance constraints are imposed, very often eciency and incentives become impossible to reconcile.
One solution suggested in the literature to alleviate this conict is that of linking or bundling several decisions together. The idea is the following: suppose there are n dierent social choice problems and that the objective is to take a socially optimal decision on them; instead of treating each problem separately, we might link them, making the decision on each single problem dependent on all the others. In other words, the n problems can be viewed as a single bundle and incentives can be pooled to obtain truthtelling at a lower cost in terms of ineciency .
This idea is applied by Armstrong (1999) to the problem of nding an (almost) optimal pricing scheme for a multi-product monopolist ! and by Armstrong (2000) to the problem of designing a revenue maximizing multi-object auction. In the former, linking takes the form of a two-part tari, in which consumers have to pay a xed charge to be able to buy any product (at marginal cost); in the latter, linking takes the form of a particular tie breaking rule: when bidders make the same (low) bid for any object, then the object is assigned to the bidder who bid highest for the other object.
In the context of public good provision, which is the one we consider here, a few papers have studied the possibility of linking. Quite surprisingly, most of these papers consider excludable public goods, i.e. goods whose usage by consumers can be somehow excluded. These papers include Hellwig (2004 Hellwig ( , 2007 and Fang and Norman (2008) . The possibility of excluding consumers from the benets of the public goods makes this problem similar to the problem of a multi-product monopolist who produces a number of private goods (the accesses to each public good) which are characterized by a xed cost of production but no variable costs. It is then not surprising that the optimal solution involves exclusion of low valuation consumers (see Fang and Norman (2008) ), just like the optimal pricing scheme of a multi-product monopolist has some consumers Hellwig (2007) points out that, even if the central agency has the power to impose her decision and the relative nancing scheme on the agents, she might not want to exert it for equity reasons: in fact, the use of coercion to obtain contributions from people who do not care of the public good makes an implicit redistribution of welfare from these people to those who really benet from it.
The term bundling has its roots in the industrial organization literature: it refers to nonlinear pricing schemes in which several goods or several units of the same good can only be purchased together (in bundles). In more general contexts, the term linking seems more appropriate, but it rests on the same idea ! Early contributions on commodity bundling by a monopolist include Adams and Yellen (1976) , Palfrey (1983) , McAfee et al. (1989) and Armstrong (1996) . More recent papers include Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) , Geng, Stinchcombe and Whinston (2005) and Fang and Norman (2006b) .
with low willingness to pay not buying any goods (see Armstrong (1996) ).
When exclusion from usage is feasible, the central agency has an additional instrument at her disposal to alleviate the free riding problem: in fact, the threat of individual exclusion makes participants more willing to contribute to the nancing of the public good. Therefore, when rst best outcomes cannot be implemented, the possibility of exclusion makes it easier to achieve good second best outcomes. In many cases, however, such an exclusion is technologically impossible or, at least, extremely costly: think, for example, to the provision of national defense or to projects that improve air quality or the beauty of a town. It is then interesting to investigate how optimal linking looks like in the context of non-excludable public goods.
There are also two recent papers that show how linking may help approaching rst best outcomes in a general mechanism design setting. Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) consider n identical copies of a general social choice problem and construct a mechanism that is asymptotically ecient. In their mechanism, the message space is rationed in the sense that agents must report a vector of messages that matches the theoretical frequency distribution. In some sense, this relaxes the incentive problems simply by deleting some incentive compatibility constraints. Fang and Norman (2006a) , instead, show that a standard Groves mechanism amended with a veto game produces an outcome which is asymptotically ecient. However, this mechanism might perform poorly when the number of problems is small; moreover, it is budget balanced only for a suciently large number of problems.
In this paper, we apply the idea of linking to the problem of providing multiple public goods in a two-agent economy. Unlike most of the related contributions, we concentrate on the standard notion of public goods, namely goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. We restrict our attention to the situation in which rst best (i.e. ecient) outcomes are not achievable and derive the optimal linking mechanism for the provision of n public goods. This mechanism "links" the n problems together because decisions and transfers are based on the whole vector of valuations of the agents. In particular, if agents have mixed valuations for a public good (one agent has a high valuation, the other a low valuation), the good is provided if the low valuation agent has a suciently high average valuation for the whole bundle of goods. This generates an increase in total expected welfare with respect to the optimal single-good mechanism, by making it unlikely to take an inecient decision. The role of transfers is crucial in driving the result: they transfer surplus from agents with a low average valuation for the public goods to those with a high average valuation, thus giving to the latter the right incentives to be truthful. We show that the mechanism is asymptotically ecient in the sense that the probability that an inecient decision is taken vanishes as the number of linked problems increases. Finally, we compare by means of an example the performance of our mechanism with the asymptotically ecient mechanism by Fang and Norman (2006a) . We show that the performance of this mechanism might be relatively poor when the number of problems is small. Instead, our mechanism is optimal in the sense that maximizes expected social welfare for all n. Thus, when the number of available problems is limited, our mechanism might yields a substantial increase in welfare with respect to the asymptotically ecient mechanism by Fang and Norman (2006a) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model; Section 3 formalizes our problem, showing also that linking cannot restore full eciency; Section 4 presents our main result, which is the optimal (2nd best) linking mechanism; in Section 5, the properties of such a mechanism are described and an illustrating example is provided. Section 6 briey concludes.
The model
Consider the following collective choice problem: A society is made of two agents (labeled #1 and #2) and has to decide whether or not to produce n identical public goods (or projects). Denote by N = {1, 2, . . . , n} the set of such goods. 
We thus assume independence not only across agents, but also across public goods. We often refer to v andv simply as low and high valuation respectively. Preferences are linear in the goods and money, i.e. The linking mechanism we look for consists of two parts: whether or not to provide each of the n public goods (more generally, the probability of providing them); and a vector of (positive or negative) monetary payments to the agents. Invoking the revelation principle, we will restrict our attention to Bayesian incentive compatible (IC) direct revelation mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms in which agents, in a Bayesian equilibrium, truthfully report their private information. The decisions and payments are thus made contingent on such reports by the agents. Formally, the linking mechanism consists of:
, that associates to each pair of vectors of valuations reported by the two agents, a vector of probabilities
, where p k is the likelihood of producing good k;
(ii) a transfer rule t :
, that determines two monetary payments, one to agent 1 (t 1 ) and one to agent 2 (t 2 ).
A reasonable property that a public good provision mechanism ought to satisfy is that the cost of the goods that are produced has to be recovered through the contributions of the agents. We formalize this property by introducing an ex ante budget balance constraint (BB). Ex ante budget balance only requires that expected payments cover expected costs; however, when types are independent and participation decisions are made at the interim stage, as in our case, we can always nd another payment scheme that satisfy the stronger requirement of ex post budget balance (see Börgers and Norman (2006) ).
Clearly, an agent is willing to contribute to the provision of a public good only if the benet he gets from such good exceeds the contribution he is required to pay. Hence, when the central agency has no coercive power, she has to make " Notice that there are no complementarities among dierent public goods.
sure that all agents voluntarily agree on the nancing scheme proposed. Besides, even though the central agency has the power to impose her decision (e.g. the government), she might not want to exert it: by doing so, even people who do not benet from the public goods at all might be required to nance it. This would raise equity concerns. We thus require that the mechanism is such that each agent's expected net benet is nonnegative, i.e. we impose an interim individual rationality constraint (IR).
We will say that a mechanism is incentive feasible if it simultaneously satises IC, BB and IR.
Anonymity and Label Free
We are going to restrict our attention to anonymous and label free mechanisms, as dened below. These restrictions, besides simplifying matters, respond to reasonable equity and symmetry considerations. Moreover, as it is shown in Fang and Norman (2008), they do not involve any loss of generality, in the sense that, for any incentive feasible mechanism, there exists another incentive feasible, anonymous and label free mechanism that yields the same social surplus. a) Anonymity (or Equal Treatment). The decision about providing any public good depends only on the reported valuations but not on "who reports what"; similarly, the payment to agent 1 when she reports x and agent 2 reports y is the same as the payment to agent 2 when she reports x and agent 1 reports y. Formally:
p(x; y) = p(y; x), t 1 (x; y) = t 2 (y; x), ∀ x, y ∈ V n . b) Label Free: the label attached to each good is irrelevant in the sense that the mechanism gives rise to the same outcome after we reshue the labels of the goods. the # Let A be a set containing n distinct elements. Then, a permutation is simply a bijection from A to itself; loosely speaking, it is a rule that changes the order of the elements of the set. For example, consider the set
Notice that π has one xed point (c, c). If we write compactly (though a little improperly) the function π as:
then it is clear why we say that a permutation reshues the elements of the set A. Very often, a permutation is dened as a bijection from a set of indexes N to itself. Then, for a general list of elements, we can attach to each element an index and dene a permutation on the list of elements as the new list arising from a permutation of their indexes. For the previous example, we can think of the permutation π as the following bijection form the set N = {1, 2, 3, 4} to itself:
In words, π moves the element of position 1 (which was a in the set A) into position 4, the element of position 2 (which was b) into position 1, and so on. The denition of permutation in terms of indexes ts perfectly to the case in which the list of elements we intend to permute contains elements that are repeated. Notice that, if we have a list of n distinct elements, there are n! dierent possible permutations (thus, in the previous example 4! = 24 dierent permutations can be generated). However, when some elements in the list are repeated, then the number of dierent possible permutations is smaller: in particular, if the list contains n elements and one element is repeated n 1 times, another element is repeated n 2 times and so on, then the number of dierent permutations from A to itself is 
An immediate consequence of anonymity is that we can restrict our attention to a single agent. Moreover, label free implies that:
(i) the decision function can be reduced to the following single-valued function:
that we will denote compactly by p (k|i; j|l), where k, j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and i, l ∈ V . This function tells us the probability of building any public good when one agent reports a low valuation v on k goods (and a high valuation v on the remaining n − k goods) and a valuation i on that particular good, while the other agent reports a low valuation v on j goods and a valuation l on that particular good. Notice that, by anonymity, we have
Notice also that, if i = v, then k cannot be equal to 0 and, if i =v, then k cannot be equal to n (the same for l and j). We overcome this problem by setting
(ii) similarly, the transfer function can be reduced to the following singlevalued function:
which we will denote t (k; j). This function gives us the transfer to an agent when she reports a low valuation v on k goods, while the other agent reports a low valuation v on j goods $ .
The linking mechanism will thus be dened in terms of (p, t) as dened above.
Notice that the number of v's contained in an agent's vector of valuations, which is crucial to our analysis, is a discrete random variable with binomial distribution with parameters n and α. In the sequel, we will denote the probability distribution of such a random variable by f n,α and its cdf by F n,α . We thus have that the probability that an agent has a low valuation v for k public goods is given by:
Because the constraints the mechanism should satisfy are all interim (or ex ante) in nature, it might be useful to consider the decision and the transfer functions at the interim stage. After all, what matters for the agents, when $ Hence, thanks to anonymity and label free, types, that originally were n-dimensional, are now completely identied by just two elements: the number of v's contained in the agent's vector of valuations and the valuation for the public good under consideration. This latter piece of information is relevant only for the decision on providing that particular good. they play, are their interim payos. Following a terminology that is common in the literature, we will talk about reduced (or reduced form) decision and transfer functions. The reduced decision function will be denoted by P k|i and indicates the interim probability, from the agent viewpoint, of providing a generic public good, when the agent's reported vector of valuations contains k v's and the (reported) valuation for that good is i. Formally, it is the expected value of the decision function p(k|i; j|l) where the expectation is taken with respect to the other agent's distribution of types:
Likewise, we can dene the reduced transfer function T k as the expected value of the transfer function where the expectation is taken with respect to the other agent's distribution of types:
In terms of reduced form decision and transfer functions (2) and (3), the interim utility of an agent who has a low valuation for k public goods and reports truthfully is thus given by:
It is worth stressing that (2) and (3) are just a more compact representation of the real mechanism, which is the one in non-reduced form (p, t). However, when we work with the reduced form decisions, we must be aware that they cannot be treated as free variables: in fact, due to the assumption of anonymity, p(k|i; j|l) enters both in P k|i and in P j|l (see (2) ) and thus these two probabilities cannot be chosen independently. Therefore, when choosing the optimal decision, we must go back to the non-reduced form.
Linking vs. separate provision
In a linking mechanism, the decision on each public good is a function of the valuations of the agents for all the n public goods involved. Moreover, a single transfer, which also depends on the valuations of the agents for all the n public goods, is determined.
A special case of linking mechanism is what we call a separate mechanism: consider the problem of providing a single public good (n = 1). Let π(i; l) and θ(i; l) denote the decision and transfer functions (and Π(i) and Θ(i) the corresponding reduced form). We will talk about separate provision of n public goods and about separate mechanism, when the single good mechanism (π, θ) is simply replicated n times. Thus, with separate provision, we have P k|i = Π(i), for all k, i.e. the reduced form decision on producing any public good depends only on the valuation of the agent for that public good; and
i.e. reduced form transfers are obtained by multiplying the number of goods for which the agent has a low (high) valuation by the separate mechanism transfer of an agent with low (high) valuation and summing them up.
Setup of the problem
The direct revelation mechanism (p, t) we look for has to be incentive feasible, i.e. Bayesian incentive compatible, interim individually rational and ex ante budget balanced. Let us state explicitly what these constraints entail in our model.
Incentive Compatibility
A direct revelation mechanism is Bayesian incentive compatible (IC) if truthtelling is a Bayesian equilibrium of the game induced by the mechanism. Thanks to anonymity and label free, the number of IC constraints of the original problem % can be greatly reduced.
According to the type of lie involved, the IC constraints can be grouped into three dierent classes: downward, upward and at constraints & .
Suppose that the agent's true vector of valuations is v and consider the vectorv which is obtained from v by replacing somev's with the same number of v's. Downward IC constraints prescribe that reportingv when the true vector of valuations is v should not be protable to the agent ' . The set of downward IC constraints is given by
where i is the number of goods on which the agent is reporting v instead ofv.
Of particular interest is the subgroup of downward IC constraints in which i = 1. We call them local downward IC constraints:
We will denote the k-th downward IC constraint with IC d k . Suppose that the agent's true vector of valuations is v and consider the vectorv which is obtained from v by replacing some v's with the same number ofv's. Upward IC constraints prescribe that reportingv when the true vector of valuations is v should not be protable to the agent. The set of upward IC constraints is written compactly as
where i is the number of goods on which the agent is reportingv instead of v.
Notice that combining downward and upward IC constraints, we obtain the monotonicity condition:
Suppose that the agent's true vector of valuations is v and consider the vectorv which is a permutation of v; in other words,v is obtained from v by simply interchanging some v's withv's. Flat IC constraints prescribe that % In the original formulation of the problem, each of the two agents has 2 n+1 possible types. Each of these types can lie in 2 n possible ways. Hence, there are (2·2 (n+1) ·2 n ) IC constraints.
& For a detailed discussion on downward, upward and at IC constraints and for their derivation, see the Appendix. ' Inv, the agent is reporting a lower average valuation for the whole bundle of goods than the truth. That's why we talk about downward IC constraints.
reportingv when the true vector of valuations is v should not be protable to the agent. The set of at IC constraints is given by
where ι is the number of interchanges, or simply
This tells us that the interim probability, from the agent viewpoint, of building a good for which the agent has a high valuation must be weakly greater than the interim probability of building a good for which the agent has a low valuation, keeping xed the total number of v andv in v .
Individual Rationality
The mechanism is interim individually rational (IR) if the interim utility the agent gets by participating in the mechanism is always nonnegative, i.e. U k ≥ 0 for all k = 0, . . . , n. It is easy to show that the only relevant individual rationality constraint is
which will be denoted by IR n . In fact, for k = 0, . . . , n − 1, IR k is necessarily true provided that the corresponding local downward IC constraint holds.
Budget Balance
The mechanism is ex-ante budget balanced (BB) if the sum of expected transfers to the agents covers the expected cost of the implemented projects, i.e.
Ecient provision
Suppose that an incentive feasible and ecient mechanism for the provision of a single public good does exist. Then, it is quite obvious that also n public goods can be eciently provided in an incentive feasible way: we might simply use the separate mechanism that replicates the single-good ecient mechanism for each of the n public goods. It is perhaps less obvious that the converse is also true: if a linking mechanism that eciently provides n public goods in an incentive feasible way does exist, then there must exist also an ecient, incentive feasible single good mechanism.
This follows directly from the denition of eciency and from the linear structure of the problem. Ex post eciency prescribes that each public good is to be provided if and only if its cost is no greater than the total benet that such good generates for the agents. This means that the ecient decision must be a function of the valuations of the agents for that particular good only. In other There are also IC constraints that are, in some sense, a mixture of downward (or upward) and at constraints. However, they turn out to be irrelevant in terms of incentives (see Appendix).
words, when eciency is required, the decision function of the linking mechanism coincides with the decision function of the single-good mechanism. Besides, by incentive compatibility and because of linearity of payos, the reduced transfer function is largely determined by the reduced decision function. Hence, given that the decision functions coincide, transfers in the linking and in the singlegood mechanism have the same shape.
Formally, eciency requires that
where Π is the ecient provision rule. By (Upward and Downward) Incentive Compatibility (conditions (7) and (5)) and using (11) , reduced transfers in the linking mechanism must be such that,
Now, for k = 0, j = n, the above inequality reads
which is exactly Incentive Compatibility for the single-good mechanism (π, θ) under (11) and after setting Θ(v) = T n /n and Θ(v) = T 0 /n. Under (11), Individual Rationality in the linking mechanism requires that T n /n ≥ −vΠ(v) (see condition (9)), which coincides with Individual Rationality of the low valuation type in the single-good mechanism (π, θ) when we set Θ(v) = T n /n (the other IR constraint is redundant).
As far as budget balance is concerned, suppose that (T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T n ) (together with (11)) satisfy IC, IR and BB. Now consider the lowest possible transfers compatible with IC and IR (T 0 ,T 1 , . . . ,T n ):
Clearly, since (T 0 , T 1 , . . . , T n ) satises BB, also (T 0 ,T 1 , . . . ,T n ) does. With these transfers (using (11)), budget balance (10) becomes:
which coincides with BB for the single-good mechanism (π, θ) under (11) and after setting Θ(v) = T n /n and Θ(v) = T 0 /n.
We summarize this observation in the following: Whether ecient provision is implementable or not depends crucially on the cost of the public good c. One can show that an ecient, incentive feasible mechanism to provide a single public good (and thus an ecient, incentive feasible linking mechanism to provide n goods) exists if and only if c ≤ 2
In particular, abstracting away from the trivial cases c ≤ 2v and c ≥ 2v, we have that, forv + v ≤ c < 2v, the ex post ecient decision function
can be implemented in an incentive feasible way through the following transfer function:
For 2v < c ≤ 2(αv+v)/(1+α), instead, the ex post ecient decision function
can be implemented in an incentive feasible way through the following transfers:
Optimal provision
The interesting case is when ecient provision of a single public good is not achievable, i.e.
(12) Clearly, in this case an ecient, incentive feasible linking mechanism does not exist either; however, we might wonder whether linking might help reduce inefciency with respect to separate provision.
The optimal separate mechanism
Under (12), the incentive feasible single-good mechanism that maximizes expected total welfare (i.e. the optimal single-good mechanism) has the following decision function:
The optimal separate mechanism is then an n-replica of this optimal singlegood mechanism.
Notice that this mechanism diers from the ecient one only in that, when the valuations of the two agents are mixed (one agent has a low valuation, the other has a high valuation), the good is provided with probability less than one. As c approaches c, we get closer and closer to eciency. The transfer function is not determined uniquely. However, one transfer function that does the job is the following:
By setting θ(v;v) = v and θ(v; v) = (v − c) if the good is provided and 0 otherwise, we obtain a mechanism that is also ex post budget balanced and ex post individually rational.
Total expected welfare generated by the optimal separate mechanism is given by :
which, compared to the potential welfare W * , gives:
The optimal linking mechanism
In this section, we derive the optimal linking mechanism, i.e. the mechanism that maximizes expected total welfare. In order to do so, we will adopt the following strategy that dates back to Myerson (1981) : we rst solve the reduced optimization problem where only the local downward IC constraints are considered (plus, of course, IR and BB) . The reduced optimization problem can be formulated as follows:
• IR n (condition (9)),
• and the feasibility conditions p(k|i; j|l) ∈ [0, 1].
After we nd a tentative solution to this reduced problem, we verify ex-post that this solution also satises the remaining IC constraints.
The following proposition characterizes the optimal linking mechanism:
Proposition 1: Suppose that c < c <c. Letk be the highest integer such that
Then the following linking mechanism is incentive feasible and maximizes the total expected welfare:
• p(k|v; j|v) = 0, k, j = 1, . . . , n;
• p(k|v; j|v) = p(j|v; k|v) = 1, k ≤k, j = 0, . . . , n − 1;
• p(k|v; j|v) = p(j|v; k|v) = 0, k ≥k + 2, j = 0, . . . , n − 1;
Here we are using the attribute reduced to mean that some constraints are ignored. This has nothing to do with the concept of reduced form probabilities and transfers introduced before.
• p(k + 1|v; j|v) = p(j|v;k + 1|v) s.t. Pk +1|v = (1 − α)γ, j = 0, . . . , n − 1;
where
.
The structure of the proof, which is relegated in the Appendix, is the following: rst we show that, in the reduced optimization problem, IR n , BB, IC d k with k > 0 must be binding in an optimum. This allows us to determine the optimal reduced form transfers and to simplify the optimization problem. We then solve the reduced optimization problem under the remaining constraints (IC d 0 and the feasibility conditions). In particular, we characterize the shape of the optimal decision function by means of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Then we completely characterize the optimal decision function by determining the optimal cuto valuek; this is done by using the fact that also IC d 0 will bind in the optimum. Finally, we go back to the original optimization problem showing that the solution to the reduced optimization problem satises also the IC constraints that were initially neglected.
Discussion
The optimal decision function prescribes that, when both agents have a high valuation for a good, then this good will be provided for sure. When, instead, both have a low valuation for a good, then this will not be produced. So far, the optimal decision function coincides with the ecient one and also with the optimal separate mechanism.
Just like in the optimal separate mechanism, ineciency arises when agents have mixed valuations for the public good, i.e. one agent has a high valuation, the other a low valuation.
In the optimal separate mechanism, when agents have mixed valuations, the good is provided with probability less than one.
In the optimal linking mechanism, instead, when agents have mixed valuations typically the good is either built for sure or not built at all. This "zero-one" decision is determined by looking at the valuation for the entire bundle of goods, which is exactly the spirit of linking. In particular, a good will be provided if the agent with a low valuation for that particular good has a "high" average valuation for the whole bundle of goods, will not built otherwise. Therefore, only the agent with a low valuation for the good is "pivotal". There is just one case in which the decision does not take a "zero-one" form and this is when the low valuation agent has a low valuation for exactlyk + 1 goods . In this case, And γ > 0.
Proposition 1 identies only the reduced form probability of building the good Pk +1|v = (1 − α) γ. There are of course innite non reduced form probabilities pk +1|v;j|v that are consistent with this reduced form probability. One could for example choose a constant p(k + 1|v; j|v) = γ.
The optimal linking mechanism identies unambiguously only the reduced form transfers.
Transfers extract all the surplus from those agents withk < k ≤ n. Instead, agent with k <k will enjoy a strictly positive net surplus (v − v) 
], that will be larger the lower is k. An agent with k =k will have a positive or null net surplus depending on whether γ is positive or null.
Basically, transfers distribute the expected net welfare only to those agents that would have liked to have more thank goods provided. Among these agents, those that wanted to have more public goods built will get a higher transfer. Instead transfers leave no rent to those agents for which less thank goods are worth building.
The expected transfer to the agent with a high valuation for all the goods is designed as to balance the budget.
Intuition
The optimal linking mechanism just described works in a quite dierent way compared with the optimal separate mechanism. Typically, it is the high valuation agent the one that is tempted to free ride. He has an incentive to pretend to have a low valuation hoping to meet a high valuation opponent in order to have the good provided anyway, without having to bear the cost. Because budget balance and individual rationality constraints impose tight upper and lower bounds to the admissible transfers, the only way to eliminate the incentive to free ride is to introduce some inecient decisions.
In the optimal separate mechanism, this is done through a reduction in the probability of producing the public good when agents have mixed valuations.
The possibility of linking the decisions on dierent public goods gives rise to a completely dierent solution to the free riding problem. Instead of reducing a little the probability of providing the good when agents have mixed valuations, in the optimal linking mechanism the decision is more drastic: in general, a the good will either be produced for sure or not at all. This decision is conditioned on the average valuation of the low valuation agent for the whole vector of goods.
To make things easier, suppose γ = 0. Consider an agent with a low average valuation for the bundle of public goods, namely an agent with k >k, and suppose this agent is considering reporting a low valuation for a good for which he has a high valuation. By doing so, the agent would suer a drastic drop in the probability of having the good built from P k|v to zero. This drop is even more pronounced for the "cuto" agent (i.e. the agent with a low valuation for exactlyk goods). By falsely reporting v for a good for which his true valuation is v, not only the probability of producing that good would fall from P k|v to zero, but also the probability of producing any other good for which his valuation is low would go to zero. It should thus be clear that agents with a low average valuation for the bundle of goods will have no incentive to free ride. This is of course inecient; however, this allows to ask higher payments from these agents and hence to alleviate the budget balance problem. In fact, this budget surplus is used to nance the decit produced by the agents with a high average valuation for the bundle (namely, those agents with k <k). In fact, if one of these agent falsely reported a low valuation for some good, he would experience only a little reduction in the probability of having the good provided. This would be protable if the reduction in the due payment were substantial. However, using the budget surplus collected from the low average valuation types, payments requested from high average valuation types are reduced enough to make free riding non protable.
Cuto value
The decision on those goods for which agents have mixed valuations is determined by the cuto valuek. This number is dened implicitly by inequality (13) . In general, it depends on the values of all the parameters involved, so we havek =k(c,v, v, α, n). We know thatk < n (otherwise we would have eciency, but we know this is not possible).
First, we provide, in the following lemma, a lower bound tok. Proof. For (13) to be satised for allv, v and for all c satisfying (12), we must have
Subtracting from both sides 2nαF n,α (k), using the fact that
and rearranging, we get
Substituting in the last inequality, we obtain
, it is sucient to show that
Finally, using the fact that f n,α (x) = n x αf n−1,α (x − 1), we get
which is certainly true fork = ⌊nα⌋. In fact, since f n−1,α (x) is maximized for x = ⌊nα⌋, it must be f n−1,α (⌊nα⌋ − 1) ≤ 1 2 . Second, we characterize the value ofk when the number of public goods n grows to innity. Lemma 2: Letk be the highest integer that satises (13) . Then
For the sake of the proof, it is convenient to set L ≡ 1+α 2
( 1 +c
Notice that α < L < 1.
The proof is based on a large number argument: by the Strong Law of Large Numbers, if (X n ) n≥1 is a sequence of random variables with binomial distribution F n,α , then
Proof. The proof goes by contradiction: suppose that (14) is false, i.e. suppose that: ∃ϵ
We have the following chain of inequalities:
where the third inequality follows from the fact that L > α and the fourth from the assumptionk n ≥ L + ϵ ′ . We thus have:
contradicting the hypothesis thatk satises (15) (or (13)). In the above, the rst inequality follows from the fact that the denominator is strictly positive but no greater than 1 and the last from the denition of δ and from the fact that L < 1.
(ii) ∃ϵ
, and consider
Let A be the set of integers that are strictly greater than N and that satisfyk n ≤ L + ϵ ′ . This set must contain innite elements. Notice that
n , for all n ∈ A This system admits a solution: in fact, Lemma 1 implies thatk +1 n > α, for all n, which, in turn, implies thatk
Finally, in (16), set ϵ = ϵ
Notice that, since, for
We have the following chains of inequalities:
where the third inequality follows from the fact that α + ϵ ′′ ≤k +1 n ; and:
where the third inequality follows from the fact that α + 2ϵ
′′ ≤k +1 n−1 . We claim thatk is not the highest integer satisfying (15) (or (13)). To see this, takek + 1 in (15). We have:
where in the rst equality we used
and where the last inequality follows from the fact that L < 1.
Asymptotic eciency
An immediate consequence of Lemma 2 is that the decision function of the optimal bundling mechanism converges in probability to the ecient one.
Lemma 3: Let p n denote the decision function of the optimal linking mechanism with n goods and p * the ecient decision function. Then, for any ϵ > 0
Proof. The event (p * − p n > ϵ) occurs only if one agent (or both) has a low valuation for more thank goods. In other words
is the probability that one agent has a low valuation for more thank goods. Notice that
becausek/n converges to L > α (Lemma 2) and X n /n converges in probability to α (by the Strong Law of Large Numbers). We thus have that β → 0 as n → ∞, which completes the proof.
An illustrating example
Suppose that the parameters of the model are the following:
The optimal linking mechanism prescribes that, if agent have mixed valuations for any public good, then the decision on that good will depend on the value ofk dened by (13) , which depends on n.
In the following table, we report the value ofk for dierent values of n. We also report the relative eciency of the mechanism, measured by the ratio between the expected welfare generated by the mechanism and the potential welfare (i.e. the expected welfare that would be achieved by an ex-post ecient decision).
As a comparison, we also report the relative eciency of the optimal separate mechanism and also the relative eciency of the asymptotically ecient mechanism introduced by Fang and Norman (2006a) .
Notice how linking yields a substantial reduction in ineciency, even when only two goods are bundled. With 3 goods, the eciency loss is already below 1%. Notice also that, compared with the mechanism by Fang and Norman, the optimal linking mechanism performs substantially better for low values of n. Obviously, since both are asymptotically ecient, the dierence between these two mechanisms vanishes as n grows. Table 1 : Relative eciency.
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the problem of providing n identical non-excludable public goods in a two-agent economy with binary valuations for each public good.
Instead of taking n separate decisions, we consider the possibility of using a linking mechanism, that is a mechanism in which the decision on each public good is a function of the valuations of the agents for all public goods. Focussing on a situation in which eciency is not achievable, we characterize the optimal incentive feasible linking mechanism.
In this mechanism the ecient decision is taken when both agents have the same valuation for a good. Instead, when agents' valuations for any good are in contrast (one agent has a high valuation, the other has a low valuation), the good is provided if and only if the low valuation agent has a suciently high average valuation for the whole set of public goods. Otherwise, an inecient decision is taken: the good is not provided at all or it is provided with probability strictly less than one. The optimal linking mechanism improves upon the optimal separating mechanism because the probability that an inecient decision is actually taken is low, and converges to zero as the number of public goods considered grows to innity.
A IC constraints Downward IC constraints. Let k(v) denote the number of v's contained in v (obviously, n − k(v) will be the number ofv's). Suppose now that the true vector of valuations is v, with k(v) < n, and suppose that the reported vectorv is obtained from v by simply replacing some of thev's with an equal number of v's (as an example, take v = (v, v,v,v,v) andv = (v, v,v, v, v) 
. Such an agent is reporting truthfully his valuation of the k(v) goods for which he has a low valuation v. Now consider the n − k(v) goods for which he has a high valuationv: for some of them (namely, k(v) − k(v) goods), the agent falsely reports a low valuation; for the remaining n − k(v) goods, he is truthfully reporting a high valuation. All in all, his interim utility is given by
By adding and subtracting (k(v)vP k(v)|v , we can simplify the above expression in
Incentive compatibility requires U (v; v) ≥ U (v; v), which reduces to
where U k(v) is the interim utility, under truthtelling, of an agent with vector of valuations v (see (4)). The set of downward IC constraints can thus be written compactly as in (5) .
Upward IC constraints. Suppose now that the true vector of valuations is v, with k(v) > 0, and suppose that the reported vectorv is obtained from v by simply replacing some of the v's with an equal number ofv's (as an example, take v = (v, v,v,v,v) 
. By reasoning exactly in the same fashion as before, one could obtain the general form of the upward IC constraint for an agent with true vector of valuations v who reportsv.
The set of upward IC constraints can thus be written compactly as (7) .
Flat IC constraints. Suppose the agent reports a vector of valuationsv which is just a permutation of the true vector of valuations v; when this happens, we have k(v) = k(v) (as an example, take v = (v, v,v,v,v) 
. If we comparev with the "true" vector v entry by entry, there will be a certain number (possibly zero) of entries that coincide (in the example, three entries coincide: the rst, the third and the fourth). The remaining entries, instead, will display v's in place ofv's, or viceversa. To go back fromv to v, we thus have to 
Incentive compatibility requires
Clearly, given that ι(v,v) > 0,v > v and k(v) = k(v), we can simplify the last inequality in
Hence, the set of at IC constraints can be written compactly as in (8) .
Actually, the downward, upward and at IC constraints derived above do not exhaust the full set of IC constraints. In fact, while reporting a higher (or lower) valuation for some of the goods, the agent might also, simultaneously, permute the valuations of the remaining goods. Consider, as an example, v = (v, v,v,v,v) and v = (v,v,v, v,v) . In this case, we have k(v) = 1 < k(v) = 2, i.e.v displays onev more than v. Now, remove from v andv the same entry so to obtain two vectors w andŵ such that k(w) = k(ŵ). In the example, we can remove either the rst or the second entry and we obtain the vectors w = (v,v,v,v) andŵ = (v,v, v,v) . Notice that w andŵ are not equal yet:ŵ is a permutation of w; to pass from one to the other, one interchange must be performed (the rst entry with the third). In symbols, we have ι(w,ŵ) = 1 or, to avoid introducing further notation, ι(v,v) = 1.
In general, the interim utility of an agent who reports a higher valuation for some of the goods (k(v) < k(v)) and, possibly, permutes some of the other entries will be given by
which simplies to
By incentive compatibility, we get
which is written compactly as
When ι = 0, we obtain the upward IC constraints (7); when i = 0, we obtain the at IC constraints (8) . Now, notice that, (7) and (8) together imply that the above inequalities are satised for all ι.
By the same token, if an agent reports a lower valuation for some of the goods (k(v) > k(v)) and, possibly, permutes some of the other entries, incentive compatibility requires
When ι = 0, we obtain the downward IC constraints (5); when i = 0, we obtain the at IC constraints (8) . Again, (5) and (8) together imply that the above inequalities are satised for all ι.
Therefore, the downward, upward and at IC constraints dened in (5), (7) and (8) constitute the full set of relevant IC constraints.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We start solving the reduced optimization problem (10) Then, in the last Step, we check whether also the ignored IC constraints are satised.
Notice that this problem does admit a solution: the objective function is continuous and the admissible set of decisions is clearly compact. What is not necessarily compact is the set of admissible transfers; however, notice that the problem involves only the reduced transfers T k and the set of admissible reduced transfers is indeed compact. Thus, by the Weierstrass maximum theorem, the problem admits a solution in terms of T k and therefore at least one in terms of non-reduced transfers t(k; j).
Step 1: BB must be binding in the optimum. Suppose not: then we could increase a little bit T0 without violating any other constraint; by doing so, expected welfare would increase. The fact that BB is binding can be written as:
value of the objective function would be unchanged, i.e. we get another solution with IRn binding. In such a solution, the value of Tn is:
to P k|v is positive both in the objective function and in the IC d 0 constraint. One could then be mistakenly led to set P k|v to the lowest possible level (that is 0) and P k|v to the highest possible level (that is 1). But, as we remarked previously, P k|v and P k|v cannot be treated independently. When choosing the optimal decision, we must reason in terms of the non-reduced probabilities. Now, observe that, from the denition of reduced probabilities (2), p(k|v; j|v) enters only in the denition of P k|v and of P j|v . Correspondingly, p(k|v; j|v) enters only in the denition of P k|v and of P j|v . We can thus safely set p(k|v; j|v) = 0, k, j = 1, . . . , n (17) and p(k|v; j|v) = 1, k, j = 0, . . . , n − 1.
(18)
Instead, the mixed probabilities p(k|v; j|v) enter both in P k|v and in P j|v and thus their optimal values cannot be determined at this point. Using (17) and (18), the reduced probabilities simplify to:
and (The expression for the IC d 0 constraint is obtained using (19) and (20) and after the same manipulations used to simplify the objective function.) Notice that only the reduced probabilities P k|v are now involved.
Step 5: Find the shape of the optimal reduced probabilities P k|v . The Langrangean for this linear programming problem is
with Kuhn-Tucker (necessary and sucient) conditions (for k = 1, . . . , n):
plus the complementary slackness conditions (for k = 1, . . . , n):
Fn,α(k − 1)P k|v
µ k (1 − α − P k|v ) = 0.
(24) Notice rst that, for all k, µ k and η k cannot be both strictly greater than 0 (if they were, than either (23) or (24) would not be satised). This means that either µ k > 0 and η k = 0 (in which case P k|v = 1 − α) or µ k = 0 and η k > 0 (in which case P k|v = 0) or µ k = 0 and η k = 0 (in which case P k|v ∈ [0, 1 − α]).
Second, notice that λ > 0, i.e. IC (12) . Hence, there must be k such that P k|v < 1 − α. What we show in the following lemma is that, for all i > 0, P k+i|v = 0. Proof. If µ k − η k ≤ 0, then the expression between square brackets in the k-th Kuhn-Tucker condition (21) is necessarily strictly negative, i.e.
We claim that the expression between square brackets in the (k + 1)-th Kuhn-Tuckerconstraint is satised. For low values ofk the constraint is satised, while for high values ofk it is not. The optimalk is the one for which the IC d 0 constraint is still satised but it is not fork + 1.
By setting P j|v = 1 − α for all k ≤k and P j|v = 0 for all k >k, the IC which can be written as (13) . The optimalk is the highest number for which this inequality is still satised.
Step 7: Show that all the IC constraints are satised in the solution found. Notice, rst, that the optimal value of the reduced form probability P k|v is independent of k and is equal to: Instead, the optimal value of the reduced form probability P k|v is decreasing in k and is at most 1 − α. Therefore, for all k, j, P k|v > P j|v . This shows that the at IC constraints (8) are satised.
To show that all the relevant downward IC constraints (5) hold, we use the fact that, in the solution, all the local downward IC constraints are binding, i.e. 
(28)
Because the optimal value of the reduced form probability P k|v is decreasing in k, we have
which is (5).
Finally, using (28), (8) and (27) we have
which implies that the upward IC constraints (7) are also satised.
